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Commentary

Regulatory Regimes and State Cost
Containment Programs
Robert B. Hackey
Rhode Island Department of Health

Kenneth Thorpe’s analysis of trends in health care spending in Canada and
the United States, which appears in this issue ofJHPPL, raises several important questions about state health care regulation. Thorpe demonstrates
that it is possible to contain costs in the context of a decentralized multipayer system of provider reimbursement, and he cites several U. S . states
that were as effective in controlling costs over the past decade as Canadian
provinces operating under a single-payer framework. Although Thorpe
argues that “expenditure containment and growth ultimately reflect the
outcomes of political bargaining among providers and payers ,” he does
not specify the form these bargaining processes have taken or what their
impact has been on states’ ability to control hospital costs over the past
decade. In the end, Thorpe’s analysis leaves us with more questions than
it answers. In particular, how can we account for significant differences in
hospital expenditures between states with similar reimbursement methodologies? Under what circumstances are state governments able to control
hospital costs effectively? And what lessons can state experiences with
hospital regulation teach us about national health care reform?
The design of regulatory institutions, the policy preferences and economic interests of public and private decision makers, and the ability of
public officials to modify providers’ behavior all influence the effectiveness of state cost containment programs. The interaction between public
I am grateful to Jim Morone of Brown University and Michael Sparer of Columbia University’s School of Public Health for their helpful comments and suggestions. This research was
generously supported by a grant from the Dean’s Fund at St. Anselm College.
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law,Vol. 18, No. 2, Summer 1993. Copyright 0 1993 by
Duke University.
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officials and health providers reflects the larger relationship between state
government and the private sector, since the development and implementation of hospital reimbursement policies occur in the context of a state’s
prevailing cultural and institutional setting. Because both political culture and the autonomy and capacity of political institutions vary from
state to state, different regulatory outcomes (e.g ., successfully controlling hospital costs) should emerge from different policy environments. In
this context, the autonomy, capacity, and legitimacy of state regulation
is often as important, if not more so, as the adoption of a particular reimbursement methodology in determining the success or failure of its cost
containment initiatives (Hackey 1992).
The institutionaland ideological Setting of
State HospitalRegulation

Several features of a state’s policy-making environment influence the development of hospital reimbursement policies. First, the policy-making
capacity of political institutions responsible for the development and implementation of rate setting has an immediate impact on a state’s ability
to control hospital expenditures. A state’s level of institutional capacity
depends on stable (and adequate) budgetary and political support, the rate
of personnel turnover, and the professionalism and expertise of regulatory
policymakers. Second, if the governmental actors in the reimbursement
process share a sense of mission, it improves a state’s ability to control
health care costs; if they do not agree over either the means or the ends
of regulation, industry groups can play legislators, bureaucrats, and other
participants off against each other in the hope of improving their bargaining position. Finally, when public officials can implement policies
that run contrary to the preferences of powerful societal interests, state
hospital cost containment efforts can be more effective. In states where
policymakers lack either the autonomy or the authority to act against the
preferences of provider groups, policy outcomes will resemble what happens with interest group liberalism (Lowi 1969) and regulatory “capture”
(Stigler 1988; McConnell 1966), in which narrowly defined economic
interests dominate the reimbursement process.
The legitimacy of state cost containment efforts has a powerful impact on the behavior of interest groups in the policy process. When state
intervention in the hospital sector is seen as entirely legitimate, legal
and legislative challenges to the regulatory system will be infrequent and
less likely to succeed when they appear. Differences in the influence of
public officials and providers also reflect variations in political culture
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from state to state, because the role, authority, and autonomy of political
institutions are shaped by a state’s prevailing political culture and traditions. In general, the more conservative states will be less receptive to
government-sponsored solutions such as rate regulation that infringe on
the decision-making powers of individuals and firms.
Regulatory Regimes and the Politics of
Hospital Reimbursement

The relationship between state governments and the hospital industry falls
into three distinct patterns, or regimes, which are biased either in favor
of, or against, the development of effective regulatory policies to control
hospital costs (Hackey 1992). Each regime represents a fundamentally
different balance between the “relative bargaining strengths of purchasers
and providers” (see Thorpe in this issue). At one extreme are the imposed
regimes, which are defined by an extreme centralization of state regulatory powers, where public officials possess the authority to reshape the
hospital reimbursement process to further the state’s interests. In contrast,
market regimes are notable for the relative underdevelopment of state
regulatory authority and a hesitance on the part of policymakers to use the
few powers granted to them. In states where regulation and traditional patterns of provider dominance remain in conflict, hospital reimbursement
policy is governed by a negotiated regime.
Imposed Regimes

Under an imposed regulatory regime, the belief that the state has a legitimate role in regulating hospital reimbursement fosters an environment in
which cost control initiatives can be successfully developed and implemented. Political support from the executive branch and the legislature
also gives state officials more leverage with industry groups. Imposed
regimes are highly institutionalized: low turnover among bureaucratic
and legislative personnel responsible for health care reimbursement issues
contributes to the development of specialized knowledge and a shared
commitment to controlling health care costs.’ For a state’s hospital regulatory policies to be classified as an imposed regime, however, public
1. See, for example, Wilson’s (1989: 95-1 10) discussion of the impact of a cohesive organizational mission on the performance of the U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, and the Social Security Administration and Perrow’s (1990) account of the effect of
goal conflict and goal displacement on New York’s response to the emerging AIDS epidemic
during the 1980s.
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officials must possess a well-defined set of policy preferences that they
are able to implement consistently as public policy.
Market Regimes

The relationship between providers, payers, and the state is fundamentally different under a market regime, where public officials possess little
or no formal authority to regulate the hospital industry. Under these circumstances, regulatory agencies are unlikely to be catalysts of change,
for the prevailing political culture favors private solutions to public problems, in the spirit of Grant McConnell’s (1966) “orthodox tradition” as
both a more efficient and less threatening solution than state intervention.
Consensus on ideological and programmatic goals among participants and
relevant publics in the health policy network is typically high, for the
state imposes few requirements on either providers or payers; responsibility for negotiating reimbursement rates rests squarely with the private
sector. A stunted bureaucracy also limits the state’s ability to develop
and implement innovative cost control policies, because both “managed
competition” and rate-setting strategies typically require that government
officials assume an activist role (Morone 1992).
Negotiated Regimes

The most common policy-making arrangements, however, fall somewhere between these two extremes, where the ability of public officials to
change providers’ behavior is limited by both institutional and ideological constraints. Under a negotiated regime, state efforts to control costs
are often hampered by high personnel turnover, conflict over program
goals, inadequate funding for state regulatory agencies, and ideological
resistance to regulatory initiatives. Policy development and implementation has a strong corporatist flavor, as state officials must turn to industry
groups for both political support and administrative assistance. Negotiated regimes thus reaffirm Huntington’s (1968: 5) contention that the
“primary problem of politics is the lag in the development of political
institutions behind social and economic change .”
The framework outlined above can shed some light on the questions
posed by Thorpe’s analysis, because the hospital reimbursement decisions
that he discusses in California, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
and New York occurred in the context of either imposed or negotiated
regimes. In each state, government officials adopted an activist role in
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the hospital reimbursement process, either by creating an all-payer ratesetting system or by designing an elaborate system of competitive bidding
for health services (e.g., Medi-Cal). In the pages that follow, I explore the
impact of differences in political culture and institutional arrangements
on cost containment in two of those states, Massachusetts and New York,
over the past decade.
New York

New York’s experience with hospital rate setting can best be understood
as an imposed regulatory regime. In no state was the “public utility’’
model of rate regulation more conspicuous than in the Empire State; by
the early 1980s, the hospital industry had lost much of its capacity for
autonomous decision making. While the state’s initial forays into hospital
rate regulation in the 1970s only set rates for Blue Cross and Medicaid,
the scope of state regulatory authority gradually expanded to include all
payers with the creation of the New York Prospective Hospital Reimbursement Methodology (NYPHRM) in 1982. When New York declined to
renew its Medicare waiver after the expiration of NYPHRM I in 1985,
subsequent versions of the state’s prospective payment system operated
as a “Medicare wraparound,” setting rates for all non-Medicare payers.
Although the state’s fiscal crisis during the 1970s provided the impetus
for officials in the Department of Health (DOH) to engage in increasingly
aggressive efforts to control the growth of hospital costs, the enormous
expense of Medicaid insured that hospital cost control remained a policy
priority. New York’s fiscal obligation to Medicaid is staggering; throughout the 1980s’ the Empire State led the nation in total Medicaid program
expenses, per capita Medicaid spending, and the number of Medicaid recipients as a percentage of the state’s population. The fiscal burden of
Medicaid helped to forge a broad consensus among public and private
payers over the importance of bringing hospital costs under control; with
strong support from both the governor’s office and the legislature over the
past decade, officials in the Department of Health presided over a regulatory apparatus that presented hospitals with one of the most competitive,
if not openly hostile, operating environments in the nation.
New York has a long tradition of regulatory activism in the health sector, dating back to the Metcalf-McClosky Act of 1964, which introduced
one of the nation’s most stringent certificate-of-need programs to curtail
hospitals’ capital expansion. Although providers have challenged both the
Department of Health’s regulatory decisions and its rate-setting powers,
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the department’s regulatory authority has generally been upheld in court.
The Hospital Association of New York State has vociferously opposed the
state’s reimbursement policies and has often found a receptive ear in
the legislature, but endorsements from Blue Cross, business groups, and
the governor’s office generally supported the DOH’s aggressive pursuit
of cost control over the opposition of the hospital industry.2 During the
1980s, the relationship between the state’s hospital industry and the department reflect a level of animosity seldom seen in American politics.
While hospitals fumed over the Department of Health’s “micromanagement” of provider reimbursement and the lack of turnover among senior
managers in the DOH, Commissioner Axelrod compared the state’s hospitals to “seventeenth-century Germanic guilds” in speeches to the state’s
business community. Under these circumstances, as one hospital executive quipped, “it’s tough to get people to be statesmanlike.” By the end
of the decade, the department had forced hospitals to shoulder the brunt
of the cost for implementing new minimum operating standards, thwarted
repeated efforts by providers to move the base year for calculating reimbursement rates, and successfully managed the transition from a per
diem reimbursement methodology to a new case-based payment system
using diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). Even after the unexpected retirement of Commissioner David Axelrod in 1991, the Department of Health
remained firmly committed to controlling hospital costs.
The ability of policymakers over the past decade to resist industry pressures and persist in their efforts to keep hospital costs under control reflected the capacity of New York’s policy-making institutions in the health
sector. In particular, the institutionalization of expertise within both the
DOH and the legislature’s principal incubator for health policy development, the Council on Health Care Financing, provided state officials
with a crucial advantage in reimbursement negotiations. While providers
criticized low turnover in key policy positions within the Department of
Health, the presence of a highly professionalized and experienced staff
enabled the state to develop and implement innovative regulatory policies
2. In 1990, however, neither the governor nor the legislature was predisposed to wage a
protracted battle over hospital costs because of the upcoming statewide election. Instead, the
reenactment of the state’s case payment system became an opportunity to appease powerful
constituencies. The legislature rejected the DOH’s proposal to pay providers on the basis of a
“group price,” where institutions’ level of reimbursement is based on the average costs for a
group of peer institutions rather than their own historical experience and pumped more than $300
million in additional revenues into the hospital reimbursement system over a three-year period.
This decision, however, was unusual, and stands in marked contrast to the policies adopted by
the legislature and implemented by the Department of Health in previous years.

Hackey

Regulatory Regimes 497

Table 1 Personnel Stability under an imposed Regulatory Regime, New
York State Department of Health, Office of Health Systems
Management, 1991
~~

Name

Position

Appointed

Raymond Sweeney

Director

1984

Previous Departmental Experience
Executive deputy director (198 183); associate director, DHCF
(1979-81)

Brian Hendricks

Executive
deputy
director

1984

Governor’s Select Commission
(1983-84); deputy director,

Health Planning Commission
(1979-83)

Steve Anderman

Assistant director, DHCF

Deputy
director,
DHCF

1982

Assistant
director,
DHCF

1982

Deputy
director,
DHFP

1989

Nicholas Mangiordo

Deputy
director,
ALTCS

1989

Deputy director, DHFP (1979-89)

Michael Parker

Associate
director,
CON

1979

Director, Bureau of Facility and
Service Review, DHFP (1976-78)

Mark Van Guysling

William Gormley

(1 979-82)

Assistant director, Bureau of
Hospital Reimbursement, DHCF
(1 978-82)

Assistant director, DHCF
( 1979-88)

Note. DHCF: Division of Health Care Financing; DHFP: Division of Health Facility Planning;
ALTCS: Alternative Long Term Care Strategies;CON: Certificate of Need Review Group, DHFP.

over the past decade (see Table 1). During the 1980s, New York led the
nation in developing new DRG classifications for neonatal conditions and
AIDS, significantly improved its DRG grouper in 1990, and began planning for improvements to be incorporated into the latest version of the
state’s case-based payment system (NYPHRM IV). In short, the technical sophistication and policy expertise of New York’s health bureaucracy
enabled it to respond to a changing environment by setting the state’s
policy agenda. In other states, however, state rate-setting programs were
less dynamic and were unable to respond to new demands and pressures.
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Massachusetts

Massachusetts’s experience with rate regulation illustrates the perils of
regulatory policy-making in an unstable political environment. Less than
a decade after the introduction of all-payer rate setting, hospital rate
regulation self-destructed and was effectively discredited as a cost control strategy in the eyes of payers, providers, and former legislative supporters. In 1991, the Weld administration’s proposal to deregulate the
reimbursement system passed comfortably in both the House and the
Senate, effectively ending the state’s foray into hospital regulation. Few
mourned its passage. The demise of rate setting in Massachusetts presents
a puzzle: Why did Massachusetts and New York have such different experiences with all-payer rate setting, despite the similarities between their
reimbursement methodologies? Furthermore, what led Massachusetts to
turn its back on regulation scarcely a decade after it came to national
prominence?
Although the state’s authority to regulate hospital reimbursement expanded considerably over time, support for regulation in Massachusetts
depended on a fragile coalition of payers, providers, and business groups
brought together to support the state’s first all-payer system (Chapter 372)
in 1982 (see Bergthold 1988). After the passage of Chapter 372, the
Massachusetts Rate Setting Commission (MRSC) took a less active role
in policy development as the locus of decision-making authority shifted
to the legislature. In sharp contrast to New York, the institution with
the most experience regulating health providers was relegated to a marginal role, since subsequent reenactments of the all-payer system in 1985
(Chapter 574) and 1988 (Chapter 23) actually specified the terms of the
contracts between providers and payers. In the legislative arena, however,
hospital reimbursement soon fell victim to the vagaries of the political
process as payers, providers, and business groups pursued their own narrow economic interests.
The origins of all-payer rate setting in Massachusetts also constrained
the state’s ability to implement policies opposed by powerful societal
groups. The state was a reluctant participant in the process which produced Chapter 372; legislators simply ratified an agreement hammered
out under the prodding of the state business community, led by the Massachusetts Business Roundtable (MBRT) (Bergthold 1988). Chapter 372
reflected the concerns of the state’s business community that hospital
costs were spiraling out of control. The all-payer system provided hospitals with a strong incentive to cut operating costs, control admissions,
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and shift patient care to less expensive, outpatient settings when it linked
reimbursement to patient volume and imposed new “productivity” incentives on hospitals. Business supported both Chapter 372 and its successor, Chapter 574, as a welcome step toward cost reduction. When
the all-payer system came up for renewal in 1988, however, the political
environment had changed. Hospitals demanded a relaxation of the strict
productivity requirements and sought additional funding to offset rising
labor costs for nurses and other allied health personnel in exchange for
their support of the Dukakis administration’s health care reform agenda.
In the end, the passage of the universal health care bill (Chapter 23) was
a watershed for rate regulation in Massachusetts: its generous treatment
of providers was a bane to business groups and a boon to providers.
The coalition that had framed Chapter 372 collapsed after the passage of
Chapter 23. After losing badly in the legislative debates in 1988, business
effectively withdrew from health policy debates to pursue other issues,
such as worker’s compensation and tax reform.
Blue Cross, for its part, felt increasingly constrained because the regulatory framework embodied in Chapter 23 prevented the company from
flexing its muscle in a more competitive bidding process. By 1988, the
state’s cumbersome proto-DRG system appeared anachronistic and inflexible to providers and payers alike. High personnel turnover and budget
cutbacks, however, prevented the MRSC from either improving the system or developing a worthy successor; with few resources, the MRSC was
overwhelmed with the day-to-day administration of the payment system.
Staff cutbacks, a statewide hiring freeze, and the attractiveness of opportunities in the private sector drained the MRSC of several of its most talented managers; leadership of the MRSC’s Bureau of Hospitals changed
hands four times between 1985 and 1990, while other key positions remained unfilled. The arrival of the Weld administration in 1990 sealed the
fate of rate setting, for the governor and his staff sought to eliminate, not
enhance, the MRSC’s regulatory authority as part of a general campaign
to “downsize” state government.
Massachusetts’s experience in controlling costs during the 1980s reflects the turmoil and instability of a changing political environment. The
state was more effective in controlling the growth of hospital expenditures in the early years of the all-payer system, when the various parties
shared a consensus on both goals and means. As this consensus began
to fray in the mid-l980s, the legislature made significant concessions to
the hospital industry in order to win reauthorization of the reimbursement
system, undermining the system’s ability to control costs. From 1982 to

28.08
28.37
41.39
39.66
37.75

23.08
24.60
30.40
22.42
20.99

Percentage Percentage
Change
Change
1982-86
1987-89

Notes. Expenditures are for short-term general and other special hospitals.
Data obtained from the American Hospital Association’s annual survey of U.S. hospitals.

I ,769,362 2,266,202 2,455,947 3,022,679
3,582,627 4,598,913 4,944,140 6,160,608
2,926,344 4,137,488 4,458,193 5,813,699
9,436,920 13,179,965 14,182,866 17,362,865
43 1,032
788,259
593,767
65 1,505

I989
(dollars)

Maryland
Massachusetts
New Jersey
New York
Rhode Island

1987
(dollars)

State

1986
(dollars)

1982
(dollars)

Table 2 Hospital Expenditures under Selected State Rate-settingPrograms, 1982-1989
Average
Change
1987-89
11.54
12.30
15.20
11.21
10.50

Average
Change
1982-86
7.02
7.09
10.35
9.92
9.44
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1986, hospital expenditures in Massachusetts increased, on average, at
slightly more than a 7 percent annual rate, reflecting the stringency of
the new cost control mechanisms introduced by Chapter 372. After 1986,
however, the Bay State was much less successful in controlling costs, as
annual increases in hospital costs nearly doubled, averaging more than
12 percent from 1987 to 1989. Although Medicaid placed a heavy burden on both Massachusetts and New York, the stringency of NYPHRM’s
all-payer reimbursement methodology successfully limited the growth in
program outlays. In New York, Medicaid expenses increased 147 percent from 1975 to 1988, compared to a whopping 332 percent increase
during the same period in Massachusetts (HCFA 1988). While hospital
expenditures increased in all of the states described in Table 2, the rate of
growth in Massachusetts and New Jersey far exceeded that in New York,
where strong political support and an experienced policy-making team
continued to campaign for cost control at the end of the decade.
Conclusion

In the end, state efforts to control hospital costs have much to teach
policymakers about national health care reform. More than three decades
after rising health care costs first became an issue of public concern,
policymakers and the public continue to search for a “quick fix” to the
nation’s health care dilemma. Too often, our search for solutions begins,
and ends, with various methods for reorganizing the health care system
(such as HMOs), reforming provider payment (DRGs), or rationalizing
the production of health services (HSAs, PSROs, and PROS). Thorpe’s
analysis, however, suggests that no single reimbursement methodology,
in and of itself, holds the key to controlling health care costs. Instead,
the problem is a political one, linked to the peculiar institutional and
ideological context of American health policy.
Successful cost control, therefore, depends not on whether providers
are reimbursed by a single payer or multiple payers, paid prospectively
or retrospectively, or whether reimbursement is computed on a per diem,
per case, or global budget basis. As Foster (1982) notes, the rate of reimbursement can be set at a high or low level under any payment methodology. Cost control is inextricably linked to the capacity and autonomy
of regulatory institutions, for without adequate authority and expertise,
government will be hard pressed to design and implement an effective
health care financing system. The experiences of Massachusetts and New
York over the past decade also lend credence to Sapolsky et al.’s (1987:
135) observation that “it is less difficult to bring together a talented group
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for designing a new program than it is to hold one together for the arduous task of program implementation and refinement .” Decentralizing cost
control responsibilities is desirable, because it would permit continued
experimentation with various methods of organizing and financing health
care services, despite the states’ inability to significantly improve access
to health services (see Stone 1992). Any proposal for national health care
reform which leaves policy implementation in the hands of the states,
however, is likely to require institution building, for not all states possess the institutional leverage to negotiate effectively with providers and
payers. If a decentralized strategy is to succeed, the federal government
must be willing to bolster the states’ regulatory capabilities; without technical expertise and a clear mandate to control costs, neither state nor
federal efforts are likely to reduce health care expenditures significantly in
the years to come.
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